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THE JOURNAL IN WAR-TIME
One year ago the JOURNAL announced an enlargement of its editorial
policy. A broader public service was to be undertaken by laying
greater emphasis upon jurisprudence as a science, involving more
accurate analysis of legal concepts, a greater emphasis upon legal
history, a wider outlook into the field of comparative law. The purpose
of this undertaking was specifically and solely practical. At no period
in history has there been a greater need, a more insistent demand,
for wisdom in legal, political, and economic reorganization.- For that
wisdom the world has always depended in large measure upon the
bench and the bar. In times like the present wise leadership is impos-
sible if the legal profession remains technical, provincial, and narrow-
minded. The nature of law and its growth, its relation to industrial
and economic development, its essential identity with the ever-chang-
ing mores of the community, its purpose in satisfying the needs and
desires of all classes of men-all these must be more specifically taught
and more generally understood.
The effort to carry out this policy during the past year was made
difficult by reason of the just and necessary demands of our govern-
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ment upon the University and upon the School of Law. It is certain
that the work of the present year will be even more difficult, with prac-
tically the whole student body and a part of the faculty in government
service. Nevertheless, for the same reasons that were controlling last
year, the JOURNAL plans to publish its eight numbers as usual and,
so far as may be within the power of its board of editors, to cover the
same field. With the righteous and unavoidable war that is now being
waged by our country this JOURNAL is in fervent, whole-hearted sym-
pathy. If in any respect the publication of the JOURNAL shall be found
to conflict with the needs of the Government it will, of course, willingly
cease publication. But in spite of the existence of war-indeed, because
of it-our courts are continually deciding cases, our legislatures are
adopting measures of almost revolutionary character, our law is under-
going rapid change and development. During such a period critical
review and comparison are doubly necessary. The JOURNAL will there-
fore continue to report on leading cases and legislation, both at home
and abroad, as fully as present conditions may permit, and will make
special effort to deal with legal problems related to the war.
In one respect the present is a most auspicious time for carrying out
the purposes of the JOURNAL. At no time have the many allied nations
felt so great a debt to America, and at no time have the jurists of
these nations been so ready as now to contribute to the pages of
American journals. It is hoped that our present volume will contain
articles on the living issues of the law by men of high standing as
jurists in England, Canada, France, Italy, and other countries of
Europe and South America.
THE LAW SCHOOL
The military necessities of the Government have called into service
practically all able-bodied men of student age. Several of the law
schools have temporarily closed; those which continue open have only
a handful of students. The registration at the Yale Law School,
including those students who by reason of induction into the Students'
Army Training Corps can devote little or no time to the study of law,
is about fifteen per cent of the normal enrollment.
The faculty also is reduced in number. The JOURNAL records with
deep regret that Professor Edgerton and Professor Hohfeld are
forced to be absent by illness. It is also a cause of regret that Pro-
fessor Dunn's resignation and return to practice in Boston have
deprived the School of his valued gervices. Professor Taft has been
granted leave of absence in order to devote himself to important
duties in Washington as a member of the War Labor Board. Pro-
fessor Morgan, now a Lieutenant Colonel in the Judge Advocate
General's office, is also to be in Washington. Professor Wurts has
returned from his sabbatical leave of absence.
COMMENTS
The curriculum remains practically the same as last year, although
the reduced number of both students and faculty will result in the
omission of a few of the usual courses. But the labors of the profes-
sors will be heavier rather than lighter than in normal years. Certain
members of the faculty are taking part in the instruction of the stu-
dent-soldiers of the University, giving courses on "Military Law"
and "Issues of the War" which form part of the curriculum prescribed
by the War Department. In addition, the absence of student editors
will compel the JOURNAL to look to the faculty for more assistance
than usual in the publication of editorial comments on recent cases.
ARMY DISCIPLINE AND THE LAW OF THE LAND
The double necessity of preserving that boasted bulwark of Anglo-
Saxon institutions, "the supremacy of law,"1 and at the same time
maintaining discipline in the military and naval forces of the nation
gives rise to interesting and troublesome problems. The soldier or
sailor is bound to obey his superior officer; he is also subject to the
law of the land.2 Consequently when ordered to do an act which may
prove to be unlawful he finds himself, in homely phrase, "between the
devil and the deep sea." If he refuses to act he will be called upon
to justify his disobedience before a court-martial, and the court-
martial may decide that the order was not unlawful; if he carries out
the order he may be haled before a civil court to answer a criminal
charge or to defend a suit for damages, and that tribunal may find
that the act was unlawful.
Faced by this awkward dilemma, soldiers will find comfort in a
recent decision of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, State v.
Burton (1918, R. I.) io3 Atl. 962. This was a criminal complaint
charging a member of the U. S. Naval Reserve Force, assigned to
duty as a dispatch carrier at Newport, with violating the state auto-
mobile speed law. His defense was that he had acted under a specific
order of his superior officer, which order was assumed by the officer
to necessitate a violation of the state speed law and was given in a
matter appertaining to the war and deemed by the -officer to be urgent.
'This phrase denotes, among other things, that "every man, whatever be
his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable
to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals": see Dicey, The Law of the
Constitution (6th ed.) i8g.
"The established principle of every free people is, that the law shall always
govern; and to it the military must always yield": Mr. Justice Field, in Dow
v. Johnson (1879) ioo U. S. 158, i6g. See also Menzies, The Rule of Law during
the War.
'Dicey, op. cit. 295 ff.; see State v. Sparks (1864) 27 Tex. 627, 632: "The
soldier is still a citizen, and as such is always amenable to the civil authority."
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The court held that the defendant was not guilty of violating the state
law.3
The doctrine of the supremacy of the law does not mean that the
ordinary rules which determine lawful conduct may never be sub-
ordinated to military necessities. The common law has long recognized
that private property may be seized or destroyed in the necessary
defense of the realm without liability, civil or criminal, attaching to
the military forces whose acts have overridden private rights.
4  No
doubt a similar privilege exists to interfere with personal liberty if
military necessity demands it.5 These are but applications of the
general principle of "necessity," which requires private right to yield
to public need-a principle which does not pertain to the soldier as
such, but applies equally to the fire-marshal who destroys a building
to prevent conflagration, 6 to the ship's captain who jettisons cargo to
save his vessel,7 or to the sheriff who seizes and restrains a dangerous
lunatic.8 The same privileges are possessed by a private individual
if the public danger makes it his duty to actf But the danger which
justifies such trespasses upon private rights must be "immediate and
impending; or the necessity urgent for the public service, such as
will not admit of delay. . . . It is the emergency that gives the
right [privilege], and the emergency must be shown to exist before
the taking can be justified."'1
*For a more complete statement of the precise question decided by the court,
see RxcET CAsE Nor s, infra.
The question whether a civil court has jurisdiction in time of war to try a
soldier for crime was not discussed. On this subject see Ex parte King (1917,
E. D. Ky.) 246 Fed. 868; (I918) 27 YALE LAW JourNuL 837.
"The King's Prerogative it; Saltpetre (i6o6) 12 Rep. 12 (6 Coke's Rep. 2o6):
"When enemies come against the realm to the sea-coast, it is lawful to come
upon my land adjoining to the same coast, to make trenches or bulwarks for
the defence of the realm, for every subject hath benefit by it. And therefore
by the common law, every man may come upon my land for the defence of the
realm, as appears 8 Ed. IV, 23."
'See Dicey, oP. cit. 505; see H. Erle Richards, Martial Law (i9o2) I8
L. QuART. REv. 133, 137; see also cases cited in L. R. A. 1915 A, ii49; and
Moyer v. Peabody (1909) 212 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 235.
'Mayor etc. of New York v. Lord (837, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 17 Wend. 285, 290.
"Mouse's Case (i6o8, K. B.) 12 Rep. 63 (6 Coke's Rep. 279).
'See Keleher v. Putnam (i88o) 6o N. H. 30.
'See Dicey. op. cit. 5o6; also Sir F. Pollock, What is Martial Law (1902)
i8 L. QuA-r. REv. 152, 153; and the Saltpetre Case, supra.
o This is the language of Taney, C. J., in the leading case of Mitchell v.
Harmony (1851, U. S.) 13 How. 115, i34, which held that Lt Col. Mitchell was
liable in trespass for seizing private property which he believed to be in danger
of falling into the hands of enemy Mexican forces. The Chief justice goes
on to explain that, in deciding the question of necessity, the state of facts as
they 'reasonably appeared to the officer at the time he abted must determine his
justification. His honest belief in the emergency is not enough; he must show
that he had reasonable grounds for such belief. Compare Dicey, op. cit. 513-519.
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It seems difficult to believe that a military necessity of this descrip-
tion could in fact have existed to carry a dispatch through the streets
of Newport at a rate of speed endangering the lives of pedestrians.
At least no such necessity was shown to exist. Moreover the deci-
sion, so far as it rests on the doctrine of military necessity, would
involve the extension of the area of necessity to include a place far
removed from the actual theatre of war.11 But the language of the
opinion is much broader than the established doctrine of necessity
as above defined. The court asserts that "any state law, the opera-
tion of which will hinder that government [the federal] in carrying
out such constitutional power [the war-power] is, during the exercise
of the power, suspended as regards the national government and its
officers who are charged with the duty of prosecuting the war"; and
further, that "any plan of the naval authorities for the furtherance
of that purpose [guarding our coast] cannot be hampered by the
enforcement of the ordinary regulations pertaining to the use of our
highways." This, it is respectfully submitted, goes much beyond the
principle of a reasonable military necessity.1 2 It would seem to permit
a military officer to override any law which he believes a hindrance
to his military activities. The fact that a federal officer or agent is
acting in a matter over which the federal government has exclusive
jurisdiction does not give him complete discretion to override the
local law.13  He is privileged to disregard the ordinary rules of con-
duct prescribed by the state law only when it becomes his federal
'A very interesting English -case intimates that modern methods of warfare
have extended the area of military necessity far beyond the immediate field of
battle. So that on the strength of the doctrine of the Saltpetre Case the court
held lawful the seizure by military authorities, without compensation, of inland
property desired for an aerodrome. In re a Petition of Right (C. A.) [lgiS]
3 K. B. 649; (1918) L. QuART. Rxv. 152. See also Sir F. Pollock, What is
Maitial Law (19o2) i8 L. QuART. REv. 152, 157: "There may be a state of war
at any place where aid and comfort can be effectually given to the enemy, having
regard to the modern conditions of warfare and means of communication."
"See Taney, C. J., in Mitchell v. Harmony, supra, 135: "Our duty is to
determine under what circumstances private property may be taken from the
owner by a military officer in time of war. And the question here is, whether
the law permits it to be taken to insure the success of any enterprise against
a public enemy which the commanding officer may deem it advisable t under-
take. And we think it very clear that the law does not permit it."
'A mail carrier is not, because of his work in handling United States mail,
privileged to disregard the reasonable traffic regulations established by the city
over whose streets he drives a mail wagon. Commonwealth v. Closson (1918,
Mass.) 118 N. E. 653, L. R. A. x918 C, 939.
See also Ex parte Marshall (1918, Fla.) 77 So. 869, holding that a motor-
omnibus owner, who was given by the commanding officer of Camp Johnston
the exclusive privilege of running a bus line between the camp and the city of
Jacksonville to transport officers and enlisted men, was not exempt from pay-
ment of the state license tax levied upon motor-carriers.
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duty to do so, and it is his federal duty to so act (in the case of a naval
or military officer whose duty is not prescribed by a specific federal
statute), only in the event of necessity arising from facts which the
officer may reasonably believe to create an immediate and impending
public danger.1"
But while one may respectfully disagree with the court's reasoning
in so far as it implies that the naval officer was justified in disregarding
the speed law, the decision exempting the dispatch carrier from liability
is believed to be sound. The law may well draw a distinction on
grounds of policy between the officer who initiates the act which over-
rides the ordinary rule of lawful conduct and the private who per-
forms the act in obedience to orders.' 5 The initiator must justify the
act on the principle of reasonable military necessity; the private,
it is submitted, may justify it on the principle of his duty to obey
every military order which does not clearly appear to be illegal.
16
Circumstances might conceivably exist which, under the principle of
necessity, would justify disregarding the speed law in order to deliver
a military dispatch in Newport (e. g., if a hostile submarine were about
to attack the coast and measures for defense required the immediate
delivery by automobile of a dispatch relating thereto). If, therefore,
the order may be legal under certain circumstances and if the non-
existence of such circumstances is not clearly apparent to the soldier,
his duty is to obey, not to debate with his superior officer whether in
fact the necessity exists which justifies it. No other rule could main-
tain discipline. Therefore, if the execution of the order infringes
private rights let the injured party seek redress from the officer who
initiated it, not from the private whose duty it was to obey. And even
more obvious are the reasons for exempting the private from criminal
responsibility for acts done in obedience to orders not clearly illegal.
It is true that not all the decisions harmonize with this theory.17
Numerous cases assert that an illegal order cannot furnish justification
to one who acts upon it.18 Such a principle, it is submitted, is
"it must be admitted that dicta may be found which imply that under our
Constitution the civil law to which the soldier remains subject is that of the
nation, not that of the states, and hence that state statutes cannot apply to
members of the military or naval forces. See Ex parte Bright (1874) I Utah,
145, i52 ; It re Fair (igoo, C. C. Neb.) OO Fed. 149, 156. The latter case was
cited by the Rhode Island court in the principal case. Limits of space forbid
a discussion of this theory. It is believed to be incorrect.
si Stephen, Hist. Crim. Law, 205; cases cited in L. R. A. i915 A, 1141 ff.
" Under some circumstances it is the duty of the soldier to disobey his officer.
See Stephen, Digest Crim. Law, 163; United States v. Greiner (1861, D. C.
Pa.) 4 Phila. 396 (order to commit act of treason); see also discussion in
United States v. Clark (1887, C. C. Mich.) 31 Fed. 71o.
' See cases cited in L. R. A. 1915 A, 1141 ff.
'See Bates v. Clark (1877) 95 U. S. 2o4, and case cited in 2 Winthrop,
Mil. Law, 135. Some of the cases may be harmonized on the principle, sug-
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unreasonably harsh toward the soldier. It is believed that the better
reasoned authorities accord with the theory above advanced. The
Rhode Island court relied in part upon this principle. So far as the
opinion sanctions the view that state statutes or the rules of the
common law may be overridden in the discretion of the military, it
is believed to go too far. Everyone will sympathize with the attitude
which strives in every way to facilitate the military and naval authori-
ties in the successful prosecution of the war, and yet even in these
times the courts must guard jealously our Anglo-Saxon heritage of
"the supremacy of law."
THE NEGATIVE CONTRACT IN OPTIONS
An option is of value as a grappling-iron to enable the option holder
to close at will with the option giver; it is no less of value as a buffer
to keep other would-be contractors away from the option giver in the
meanwhile. This last is worth remembering; sometimes a case serves
to point the moral that it is.
For a valid consideration Mrs. Saraceno made an agreement with
Carrano regarding certain of her real estate, "meaning . . . . to
give to the said A. R. Carrano the option upon the purchase" of the
property for $II,2OO, if Mrs. Saraceno "at any time should desire to
sell said property." Nine years later Mrs. Saraceno brought suit to
have the agreement cancelled and her property freed from any cloud
created by it. The court held that the agreement was a "double option"
under which the plaintiff might elect to sell or not to sell, and that
after the lapse of nine years it was to be presumed that she had elected
not to sell. Consequently, the court ordered that the agreement be
cancelled and the plaintiff's property discharged from all encumbrance
by reason of it. Saraceno v. Carrano (1918) 92 Conn. 563, 103 Atl. 631.
The general idea of option appears to contain several essential
elements: (I) a power in the option holder, (2) to impose, wholly at
his own choice, a duty upon the option giver, (3) which power is
derived through a previous legal trangaction between the two, is (4)
of a certain permanence in point of time, irrevocable throughout its
duration, which is fixed in advance, and (5) is accompanied by a duty
in the option giver not to wipe out the power by conveyance to a bona
fide purchaser for value, and (6) by a disability in the option giver to
convey free of the option holder's power to any person not a bona fide
purchaser. The ordinary offer of a contract is not an option because
it lacks these last three elements.1 The transaction in the principal case
gested in Wyman, Administrative Law, secs. 2-3, that where a discretion is
vested by law in the officer, his order will protect his subordinate, but where
the -officer's duty is ministerial merely, his order will not protect.
'Dikkinson v. Dodds (;874, C. A.) 2 Ch. D. 463..
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is not an option because it lacks the first two elements.
2  Carrano did
not have the power at his own choice to impose a duty on Mrs. Sara-
ceno. His right to require conveyance could not be acquired until
she should desire to sell. On the affirmative side, therefore, Mrs.
Saraceno's agreement seems worthless to Carrano, as unenforceable.
But it is Janus-faced. It contains a negative promise: not to sell the
land to any other person without first offering it to Carrano. This is
but another phrasing of the language of the contract. The duty thus
imposed can be gotten rid of, and the privilege and power to convey to
another person can be acquired, only by offering the land to Carrano--
and with that offer he would obtain a true, though short-lived, option.
Mrs. Saraceno's privilege and power of free alienation are hedged in by
this agreement; and her only way out is through the actual creation
of that option.s
But Mrs. Saraceno called this pre-option agreement of hers an
"option." The court refers to it as a."double-option." Thus is added
one more to the many-featured creations to which the term option is
applied; for even within the limits of the concept as defined above
there are possible and there do exist a number of clearly distinct situa-
tioni.4 To insure sound decisions such distinct situations must be
recognized and treated as distinct. In the principal case there is
reason to believe that the court was led to consider the agreement
lightly because it gave Carrano no power to compel conveyance on his
own motion; the court did not, it is respectfully submitted, duly weigh
the negative promise.
The court asserts that Mrs. Saraceno had a "right to elect not to
sell" her property to anyone for $II,2OO, and that "after the lapse
of nine years it is to be presumed that she made the choice and elected
not to sell." But this, it is submitted, is not a fair interpretation of
the agreement. The purpose of the parties was to secure Carrano
2 Much less would it seem correct to call it a "double option." In a double
option each party should have a power; as, for example, where each pays 
a
cash consideration and each promises to perform if the other shall so elect;
or where a contract for the purchase and sale of land is concluded, the ripening
of the respective duties being conditioned on the election of either party, within
a fixed period, to demand performance; or where either party has the power
on his own motion to terminate a contract, as in the New Jersey separation
agreement treated infra, in RECENT CASE NOTES.
'Manchester Ship Canal Co. v. Manchester Racecourse Co. (C. A.) [19Ol]
2 Ch. 37; contra, Fogg v. Price (1888) 145 Mass. 513, 14 N. E. 741, where the
court decided with hesitation, laying stress upon the lack of a definite price fixed
in advance-though this hardly seems essential. Even in that case, however,
the only thing in question was the power of alienation; the only thing refused
was specific performance against a purchaser with notice; element (5) remains,
enforceable in an action at law.
'See for detailed discussion Corbin, Option Contacts (1914) 23 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 641; see also (917) 26 ibid. 783, and (I917), 27 ibid. 261.
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an option to purchase if she "at any time should desire to sell said
property." As indicated above, this is equivalent to a promise not
to sell without offering to Carrano; which was to secure him the
benefit of any change in Mrs. Saraceno's circumstances or mind. To
say that she can terminate this duty merely by electing to do so, robs
the contract, for which he gave consideration, of all value to him,
and is an unsound construction of the parties' expression of intention.
Indeed the very case the parties envisaged was before the court: one
removes clouds on title that he may sell-to someone else.
The real problem of construction is to determine how long the duty
was to last. Was it to bind the land in perpetuity, or only for a reason-
able time in view of the situation of the parties at the time the agree-
ment was made? Or-which is but a special form of the "reasonable
time"--during Mrs. Saraceno's life? It is believed that the reasonable
time construction might most fairly be adopted, and that the court's
decision may be sustained on the ground that it had elapsed. But so
far as the opinion involves a holding that the agreement reserved to
Mrs. Saraceno a "right" to elect not to sell, it is believed to be
unsound. The parties said nothing of a power in her to set the whole
transaction at nought by electing not to sell. To read such a power into
the contract decreases almost into nothingness the business value of
the negative covenant included in such contracts.
RECOGNITION OF "MASSACHUSETTS RIGHTS" BY NEW YORK COURTS
The recent case of Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York (1918,
N. Y.) 12o N. E. 198 is noteworthy as marking a departure by the
New York Court of Appeals. not so much from its past decisions upon
the problem involved as from the doctrines of the Conflict of Laws
upon which those decisions were based.' A resident of New York
had been wrongfully killed in Massachusetts by the act.of a servant
of the defendant, the latter being also a resident of New York.2
Under the Massachusetts statute, conceded by all parties to be applicable
to the case if the suit were brought in that jurisdiction, an action
accrued in favor of the estate of the deceased for the benefit.of his
widow and children. This statute fixed the damages at not less than
$500 nor more than $IOooo, to be assessed not according to the loss
suffered by the beneficiaries but "with a reference to the degree of
culpability" of the defendant or his servant. The Court of Appeals
'Wooden v. Western N. Y. & P. R. R. Co. (i8gi) 126 N. Y. 10, 26 N. E.
io5o, apparently is in effect overruled.
'The defendant was a New York corporation. As is well known, it is common
to regard such a "legal person" as a resident of the state in which it is incor-
porated. Of course this is pure fiction, based upon the fiction of corporate
personality.
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held that the plaintiff, the administrator, could recover in New York
in accordance with the terms laid down in the Massachusetts statute,
even though these differ from the corresponding New York statute.
So far as the authorities go upon the precise question involved they
are, as is well known, in conflict, although the more modern cases tend
to adopt the view which prevailed in the case before us. 3 In stating
the problem before the court Mr. Justice Cardozo said: "The ques-
tion is whether a right of action under that [the Massachusetts]
statute may be enforced in our courts. 'The courts of no country
execute the penal laws.of another.' The Antelope (1825) io Wheat.
66, 123." He then decided that the statute, while "penal" so far as
the amount of damages was concerned, was intended essentially to
redress a private wrong, and so not within the rule quoted. He also
held that no public policy of Nfew York forbade the "enforcement"
of a "foreign right" of this character.
The decision in the case commends itself as a sound result. Indeed,
it is not too much to hope that it is only another step toward a "uni-
form interstate enforcement of vested rights."4  As to the reasoning
of the court, so far as it involves a discussion of the fundamental
theories of the Conflict of Laws one cannot be quite so sure. Indeed,
when one reads the cases and the text-writers upon this branch of
Anglo-American law he discovers little but chaos, both as to concrete
decisions and as to the reasons therefor. Even a superficial study
will, it is believed, reveal the difficulty, viz., that there is no consensus
of opinion as to the fundamental concepts involved; that the under-
lying logical and legal bases of the doctrines are in dispute. Some
see in the Conflict of Laws a body of real international law; others
regard it as a body of law dealing with the "recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign created rights," perhaps on the basis of "comity"
or because the foreign rights are "vested" -but space fails in which
even to enumerate all the various opinions as to fundamental theory.
Small wonder that there is a confusion of tongues and a conflict of
decision.
Much of the difficulty seems to be due to false notions as to the
"territoriality" of law, notions which the present opinion seems at
many points to adopt.5 In the classic treatise of Story the doctrine
is thus stated: "No state or nation can by its laws directly affect or
bind property out of its own territory, or bind persons not resident
'The leading cases are cited in the opinion in the case under discussion.
Citation is therefore omitted here.
"Cf. Beach, "Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights" (1918) 27
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 656.
'Thus the learned judge says on page 2Ol of the opinion: "A foreign statute
is not law in this state, but it gives rise to at obligation which, if transitory,
'follows the person and may be enforced wherever the person mnay be found."
(The italics are those of the present writer.)
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therein, whether they are natural born subjects or others."8  To what
extent is such a statement true? What meaning can it have? Aside
from some existing system of positive law-constitutional, statutory,
or judge-made-it seems clear that there is no inherent reason why
the law of any sovereign nation-England, for example-may not,
if the sovereign English Parliament or the appropriate English court
so decrees, attach any legal consequences whatever to any state of
facts whatever, including acts done in other countries, even by persons
not citizens or residents of England. This simply amounts to saying
that as a sovereign nation England may determine what legal conse-
quences shall in England, by English courts, be held to attach to a
given state of facts, if in any way the English court is presented with
a case involving them.7 Suppose, for example, that an English statute
should provide that any person whatsoever who, under the circum-
stances described in the statute, injured any other person anywhere
in the world, should be deemed guilty of a tort and that if he ever
came into England or owned any property there he should be subject
to suit and damages assessed in a prescribed manner: surely the
English courts would be bound to apply the statute to all cases coming
within its scope.8 Clearly, also, they could not enforce the statute
against persons committing the acts in question outside the jurisdic-
tion so long as these persons both remained outside and had no property
within the jurisdiction. To describe this situation in appropriate legal
terminology must we not say that such a statute would as a matter of
substantive law create primary rights in every person in the world
to have all other persons refrain from the described conduct, and that
when anyone was guilty of those acts anywhere a secondary English
right to damages would arise? This right could not, of course, be
enforced so long as the tortfeasor both remained outside of .England
and had no property there; but this is equally true where the tort
is committed in England and the tortfeasor before action is brought,
or even after it has been brought, leaves that jurisdiction and has
no property within the same. That the law of England does not in
fact attempt to go so far as in the case just put does not, then, show
'Conflict of Laws (8th ed.) sec. 2 . The present writer doubts whether Story
meant all that later writers have attributed to him.
"Of course some other sovereign nation may object, on the ground that
"international law" is being violated, or on any other grounds it chooses to
assert. The United States, for example, did this successfully in the Cutting
Case, in which Mexico claimed the right to punish an American citizen for acts
done in the United States. 2 Moore, Int. Law Dig. 228. It can hardly be
asserted, however, the Mexican law was not law in Mexico, i. e., binding on the
Mexican courts. If from the present war there emerges a real League of
Nations with power to enforce its decrees, a different legal situation may result.
'It is not contended that a system of law which did this would be a convenient
system, but merely that it is not a logically impossible one, as seems to be
assumed by so many writers and judges.
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any inherent lack of power on the part of the English legislature or
courts, but merely that they have refrained from establishing such a
system for other reasons.9
It frequently happens that all the operative facts 0 of a given case
do not take place in one jurisdiction. The principal case is an excel-
lent example. From the point of view of a Massachusetts court the
chief facts were as follows: the defendant, a resident of New York,
had employed a servant (whether the making of the contract of
employment, i. e., all the acts of the defendant in hiring the servant,
took place in New York or Massachusetts or somewhere else does
not appear) ; the servant, acting within the scope of his employment,
did certain acts negligently in Massachusetts; as a consequence a
person was injured there; that person died in Massachusetts; he left
surviving a widow and children, all residents of New York. To these
facts all conceded that the Massachusetts statute applied. Be it noted
that if the agreement of employment was made in New York, the acts
of the defendant were all done in New York. Nevertheless, we find
it conceded that Massachusetts law both confers upon residents of
New York (the administrators, the widow, and the children of the
deceased) a right to damages and also imposes upon a resident of New
York a correlative duty to pay those damages, in spite of the fact
that not one of the parties has ever done anything in Massachusetts
or, so -far as appears, has ever been within the borders of that state.
1"
From the point of view of a New York court we must add as a part
of the operative facts the existence of the Massachusetts statute and
the resulting "Massachusetts rights," which include (i) the primary
right that the acts in question shall not be done and (2) the remedial
right to damages which arises when the acts have been committed.
The problem for the New York court, it is submitted, therefore is,
not whether the Massachusetts statute or "Massachusetts right" shall
be enforced in New York, but simply, what legal consequences accord-
ing to New York law attach to all of these facts ?12 Does New York
law attach the same legal consequences to these facts that are attached
by the New York statute to similar facts, all of which take place in
New York? Conceivably it may; but also conceivably it may regard
the existence of the Massachusetts law and the resulting rights in
Massachusetts courts-regarding them as facts-as reasons for attach-
'Lack of space forbids even an enumeration of these reasons. One doubtless
was the very notion of the territorial limitation of law, the erroneous character
of which it is sought here to demonstrate.
"The term "operative facts" seems a happy one to describe the totality of
facts to which the law attaches certain legal consequences.
"' Doubtless the fiction of the "identity" of the servant with the master has
served to conceal the truth of the situation. When that is discarded one sees
at once that the "territorial" theory that the law of a country cannot impose
substantive legal duties on persons outside the jurisdiction would prevent the
Massachusetts statute from imposing duties upon the defendant in the principal
case.
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ing legal consequences identical in scope with those attached by the
Massachusetts law to the facts which for that jurisdiction constitute
the operative facts.
If the foregoing be the correct analysis of the situation, it is clear
that the New York court is not enforcing the Massachusetts right
of action, but a New York right of action given by New York law
but identical in scope with the Massachusetts right. One or two
analogies may perhaps serve to bring out the point of view here sug-
gested. It is common to speak of "enforcing" foreign judgments.
This clearly is a loose and/technically erroneous way of putting the
matter. What we ought to say is, that the common law of England
and of each of the American states attaches to foreign judgments
which comply with certain conditions the legal consequences described
in our law by the term "debt." The action brought in a common law
jurisdiction is for the purpose of enforcing or vindicating that common
law debt, not the foreign judgment. The latter is merely one of a
set of operative facts which according to the principles of the common
law result in a debt. Similarly, where a common law court permits
an action of debt to be brought upon a chancery decree for the pay-
ment of money the common law court does not "enforce the chancery
decree" in any way. It merely treats the latter as an operative fact
which results in a common law debt, for the non-payment of which
the common law court will give relief.
It is not within the purpose of the present note to discuss the con-
siderations which should guide courts in settling specific problems
within the field of the Conflict of Laws. It may, however, be noted
in passing that courts in America have naturally done what they do
in other branches of the law, viz., examined the decisions of other
common law jurisdictions. Indeed, they have gone farther, for it
may be said that the civilized nations of the world have within the
field of the Conflict of Laws attempted to do what all our state courts
have been trying to do with cases which are to be settled by "the
common law," i. e., applied a hypothetical system of law which is
supposed to be common to all nations; hence the confusing term
"Private International Law." But here, as elsewhere, the fact cannot
be blinked that from the point of view of law in the technical sense
the law applied is "not a brooding omnipresence in the skies
it always is the law of some particular state [country]."13
W. W. C.
'The Massachusetts law is of course a fact for the New York court; equally
so is the "Massachusetts right."
'Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen
(1917) 244 U. S. 205, 37 Sup. Ct 524. The learned justice was speaking of the
"common law." From the point of view of an English or American lawyer,
the law governing cases falling within the domain of the Conflict of Laws is,
so far as no statute regulates the matter, "common law" and nothing more.
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HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS AND THEIR DATING
The presence of so many Americans in European countries is
likely to give increased importance to the law of holographic wills.
Belgium, France, Italy, Austria and Germany permit this kind of
testamentary disposition. Under our own rules of the conflict of laws,
holographic wills executed by American soldiers or civilians in any of
the above countries in conformity with the local law of the place of
execution, will be recognized in many of our states, even though the
local legislation of the particular state does not sanction holographic
wills executed at home.'* In the rest of the states such wills may be
regarded, under the renvoi doctrine, as valid to pass personal property,
if the testator was domiciled in a state authorizing the execution of
wills in accordance with the lex loci, and may be regarded as valid to
pass realty where the land is situated in such a state.
2
A holographic will is the simplest form in which a written will may
be expressed. As its name indicates (6Xos - entirely; ypabev = to
write) the will must be written in its entirety by the testator. Beyond
this requirement nothing is essential for the validity of this will.
Modern stitutes, however, have frequently imposed the additional
requirement that it shall be dated. In Spain,3 Porto Rico,' the
Philippine Islands5 and Honduras it must be upon stamped paper
corresponding to the year of its execution. In Japan the testator must
affix his seal.7 In North Carolina8 and Tennessee 9 the holographic will
must be found among the valuable papers or effects of the testator
or have been lodged by him with somebody for safe-keeping.
Holographic wills are of Roman origin. They were first authorized
by the emperors Theodosius and Valentinian;1O but all private testa-
ments were prohibited by Justinian except in the case of testamentary
dispositions by ascendants in favor of their descendants." The modern
holographic will arose in the customary law of northern France.'
2
Through its recognition by the Code Napoleon 3 it has influenced the
law of other countries. Following the French example, holographic
wills are now recognized in Austria,' 4 Belgium, 5 Germany," Italy,:"
Roumania,' 8 Spain'9 and Switzerland, 2
0 in Scotland2' and in Quebec,22
in about one-third of the states of this country,23 .Porto Rico,24 the
Philippine Islands,25 a few of the Central and South American states,
26
and in Japan.2 They are not valid in Denmark, Norway, Portugal,
Russia, Sweden, nor in England and most of the states of North and
South America.
28
Notwithstanding the simplicity of its form the holographic will
has given rise to much litigation. It appears to be recognized generally
that a will, written29 in its entirety 0 by the testator and properly signed
and dated, need not be clothed in any particular form. Not infre-
* The footnotes will be found following the text of this COMMENT.
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quently it has taken the form of a letter.31 There appears to be
agreement likewise that it may be written with pencil3 2 or with any
other instrument and that it may be expressed in any language known
to the writer.33 As regards the date there are wide differences in the
law of the different countries.3 4
Several decisions of the French court of cassation of recent date
call attention to the importance of the date in a holographic will. In
one of them the will, dated "Feb. 8, 18o9," was actually executed
on Feb. 8, i9o9.g . In another case the date indicated was "May 3,
1898," the actual date of execution being Feb. 3, 1909.36 In both
cases the will was sustained, the court holding that the precise date
of execution appeared with certainty from the contents of the will
itself.
In Austria,37 Arkansas,38 Arizona, 3 Kentucky, 0 Mississippi,4' North
Carolina,42 Tennessee,43 Texas,4 Virginia45 and West Virginia" the
date is not essential for the validity of a holographic will. In all
other countries recognizing holographic wills and in California,4 7
Idaho,4" Louisiana,'49 Montana,50 North Dakota5' and South.Dakota 2
the will is void as a holographic will unless dated. Differences exist
concerning (i) the mode of indicating the date; (2) the permissibility
of ante-dating or post-dating; and (3) the possibility of proving the
will notwithstanding a defective or incomplete date.
i. Mode of indicating date. The civil codes of Italy, 53 Spain,5 4
Porto Rico,5 5 the Philippines"o and Honduras" specifically require
that the date shall indicate the day, month and year. Such an indica-
tion is necessary also under the law of those countries and states whose
codes or statutes provide merely that the holographic will must be
dated. If either the year or month or day is omitted, the will is
invalid.la All are agreed also that an equivalent expression suffices,
for example, "New Year 1918," "Easter Sunday I918."58 The date
must be entirely in the handwriting of the testator. If it is printed in
part the will is invalid.50  The place of the date is immaterial. It
may be in the beginning, in the middle, or at the end of the will 0 and
may follow the signature."' It may be in the text, provided it is
intended as a date.62 In France a holographic will not expressing any
date has been sustained where the time of its execution appeared with
certainty from the terms of the will.6 3
2. Permissibility of ante-dating and post-dating. There is agree-
ment on the continent that if a wrong date is inserted with a fraudulent
object, for example, to cover a lack of capacity, the will is void.6
Where the motive is innocent Belgium allows either an ante-dating
or a post-dating.6 r In case of post-dating the testator must survive
the date inserted; otherwise the will is void.66 In France 67 and'Ger-
many6 it is insisted that the requirement of a date in the nature of
things implies the true date and that an ante-dating or post-dating
necessarily renders the will void. Italy6" takes the same view, although
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there is a decision70 authorizing a post-dating where the testator
survived the date indicated.
71 In this country the precise question has
not come before the courts.
2
Suppose that a holographic will is written and signed but that the
date is written on a subsequent day. Must the testator affix the latter
date ?7 According to the view of the German law the will i not
deemed executed until the affixing of the date, that is, until all the
formal requirements have been satisfied. The time when the date is
written thus constitutes the true date.
74 In France, on the other hand,
.the date must be affixed, it seems, at the latest when the signature 
is
attached. The will cannot be dated later, and must therefore be
re-written.7 5  The Supreme Court of California has held that the
testator may adopt the earlier date.
76
According to the law of some countries the incorrectness of the
date can be established only by means of evidence furnished by the
will itself. 7 The proof is not so restricted in case of fraud, undue
influence or insanity.
7 8
3. Possibility of proving the will notwithstanding defective 
or
incomplete date. The states that require the insertion of the true date
avoid the will where the instrument is proved to have a wrong date,
although the real date of execution can be ascertained with certainty
from the will itself. They take this view notwithstanding the fact
that the capacity of the testator is not challenged and there is no
allegation of fraud, undue influence and the like.
When a wrong or defective date is inserted through inadvertence
the courts of Belgium,7
9 France,"0 Italys' and Argentina
2 take a more
liberal view and sustain the will, if the true date can be determined
with certainty from the will itself, that is, either from the facts
appearing therein or from the watermark of the paper when the will
is written upon stamped paper. The recent decisions of the French
court of cassation, already mentioned, support the same doctrine. The
proof is not so restricted in the United States.
3
A stricter view has been maintained by the highest court of Ger-
many. 4 An untrue date has been held to render a holographic will
null and void without distinguishing between an intentional and acci-
dental insertion of a wrong date. A recent case modifies this doctrine,
at least to the extent of holding that where the wrong date is obviously
a mistake, as where "18o4" is written for the year "I9O4," it may
be corrected by proof furnished by the will itself.
85
The rule governing erroneous dates is applied in Belgium," 
France, 7
Italy"8 and Argentina, 9 also where the date is incomplete. The Ger-
man law is doubtful.9
0 The American cases have not raised the
precise point.9'
The requirement of the date does not include the place of execu-
tion.9 2 Such place must be indicated under the law 
of Switzerland
3
and Germany.94 In these countries a holographic will omitting the
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place of execution is void. The place of execution, too, must be in
the handwriting of the testator; if it is printed the will is void. 5 If
the will is executed en route between two places, for example, on a
train from Paris to Rome, a statement to that effect is sufficient without
mention of a particular place.96 The place of execution need not be
mentioned in any particular part of the will. What has been said in
this regard concerning the date applies also with respect to the place
of execution.9 7
E. G. L.
'Connecticut, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Missouri, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, Wisconsin as regards per-
sonal property; and Connecticut, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Vermont and Wisconsin
as regards realty. See (IgI) 20 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 432-433, 435-436.
'Anglo-American courts have been inclined to understand the term "foreign
law" to include the rules of the conflict of laws of such country. Some of the
English courts have done so as regards the formal execution of wills. Collier
v. Rivaz (1841) 2 Curt. Ecc. 855. In the same manner the American courts,
sitting in a state where the common law rule which determines the formal
validity of a will in accordance with the lex domiciiii at the time of death has
not been changed by statute, might say that if the law of the testator's domicile
at the time of death authorizes the execution of a will disposing of personal
property in the form prescribed by the law of the place of execution, a will
satisfying such law is executed in accordance with the lex domicilii as pre-
scribed by the law of the forum. The same form of reasoning would be
applied a fortiori with respect to devises of real property, if the law of the situs
authorizes the will to be executed in a foreign country with the formalities
prescribed by the law of such country.
The unsoundness of the renvoi doctrine in general has been shown by
Lorenzen (igio) 1O CoLumBiA L. REv. 190, 327, and in (igi8) 27 YALE LAW
JoURNA r, 5o9. The doctrine may be approved, however, as regards realty. See
(1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 530-31.
If the testator is domiciled in a state which recognizes holographic wills
or if he owns real estate in such a state, a will disposing of personal property
executed in the form prescribed by the law of his domicile and a will dis-
posing of realty executed in conformity with the law of the situs are valid, of
course, by virtue of the ordinary American rules relating to the conflict of laws.
Moultie v. Hunt (1861) 23 N. Y. 394; Succession of Hasling (i9o5) 1I4 La.
294, 38 So. 174. See also Matter of Newell (1895) io Hawaii, 8o; Ross v.
Ross (1893) 25 Can. Sup. Ct. 307.
' Civil Code, art. 688.
'Civil Code, art. 696.
'Civil Code of 1899, art. 688.
'Civil Code, art 885.
'Civil Code, art. io68.
' Stat, sec. 5864.
'Code, sec. 3896.
"See Codex Theodosianus, bk. 4, tit. 4, de testamentis.
"Code, VI, 23, 21; Novel lO7.
"Baudry-Lacantinerie & Colin, Traitj thorique et pratique de droit civil,
Donations entre vifs et testaments, no. 1878; 3 Colin & Capitant, Cours ili-
mentaire de droit civil franjgais, 845; Pothier, Trait sur le testament (ed.
Hutton, 18io) 4.
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'The ancient French law did not require a date for the validity of a holo-
graphic will. The requirement was introduced by the Ordinance of 1735.
Baudry-Lacantinerie & Colin, no. 1925.
1 Civil Code, art. 578.
" Civil Code, art. 97o.
1 Civil Code, art. 2231. The first two drafts of the German code declined
to recognize the holographic will. It was accepted in the end upon the insistent
demands of the Rhenish population, which had become acquainted with its
advantages through the Code Napoleon.
' Civil Code, art. 775.
1" Civil Code, art. 859.
"Civil Code, art. 688.
"Civil Code, art. 505.
'Bell, Principles of the Law of Scotland (6th ed.) 787.
'Civil Code, art. 850.
'Ark. St. sec. 8o12; Ariz. Rev. St. 1913, sec. 1207; Cal. Civil Code, sec. 1290;
Idaho Civil Code, sec. 2505; Ky. St. sec. 4828; La. Civil Code, art. 1588; Miss.
Code, sec. 3366; Mont. Rev. Code, sec. 4727; N. C. St. sec. 5864; N. Dak.
Comp. L. 1913, sec. 5648; S. Dak. Code, sec. ioo6; Tenn. Code, sec. 3896; Tex.
Rev. Civil St. 1911, art. 7858; Va. Code, sec. 2514; W. Va. Code, sec. 3135.
21 Civil Code, art. 696.
'Civil Code of 1899, art. 688.
2Argentina Civil Code, art. 3673 ff.; Honduras Civil Code, arts. 885, 886.
'Japan Civil Code, art. io68.
" See Roguin, Traitg de droit civil compari, La succession, vol. 3, n. 1314.
"To the effect that the testator may not write a holographic will on a type-
writer see In r7 Dreyfus' Estate (1917, Cal.) 165 Pac. 941. See also Robertson's
Succession (1897) 49 La. Ann. 868, 21 So. 586. So also 3 Endemann, Lehrbuch
des biirgerlichen Rechts (8th and 9th ed. 19o8) 118; Herzfelder, Erbrecht, in
5 Staudinger, Kommentar sum biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch (7th-8th ed.) 61o; i
Strohal, Das deutsche Erbrecht (3d ed. 19o3) I2O note. Contra: In re Aird
(1905) 28 Quebec Super. Ct. 235.
If a part of the will is printed the instrument is void. Robertson's Succession,
supra; In re Plumel (19o7) 151 Cal. 77, 90 Pac. 192; Re Noyes (19o9) 40
Mont. 19o, 1O5 Pac. 1017.
'Additions by third party:.
Argentina: Art. 3674 provides expressly that if anything is written in a
strange hand and the writing forms a part of the testament itself, the testament
is void if the writing was done by order or with the consent of the testator.
France: If a third party adds anything to a holographic will without the
knowledge of the testator it has no effect upon its validity. Cass. Apr. 14,
1874, D. 1875, 5, 423-424; App. Rouen, June 13, 1893, D. 1894, 2, 207. If an
addition is made with the knowledge of the testator, the will will be void if
the additions are regarded as a part of the will. The French courts have
gone far, however, in sustaining such wills. Cass. July 16, 1878, D. 1879, I, 129;
App. Poitiers, Feb. 1, I881, D. 1881, 2, 149.
Germany: According to 5 Planck, Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch, 622, an addition
by a third party will destroy the will only if such addition is important. See
also Kipp, Das Erbrecht, in 2 Enneccerus, Kipp. & Wolff, Lehrbuch des buirger-
lichen Rechts (Ist and 2d ed. 1911) pt. 3, P. 39; 5 Herzfelder, 6o8-609; i
Strohal, io6. Endemann holds the view that the will is destroyed by the addi-
tion of a single word, however trifling (Vol. 3, p. 118).
Japan: According to De Becker (4 Annotated Civil Code of Japan, 97) a
single word added by another will render the will void.
United States: In this country the will is sustained if the words added by
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the third party are not necessary to complete the instrument and do not affect
its meaning. See the cases collected in note, 20 Eng. & Am. Ann. Cas. 369.
"France:, Cass. Feb. io, 1879, D. 1879, I, 298; Cass. Feb. 5, Igoo, D. I9oo,
1, 557; Cass. July 28, i9o9, D. igio, i, 44; App. Rennes, May ig, i8gi, D. 1892,
2, 438.
Germany: 3 Endemann, ii8; Kipp, 37; 5 Planck, 623.
Japan: see 4 De Becker, g8.
United States: Alston v. Davis (i896) ii8 N. C. 202, 24 S. E. i5.
Contra: Argentina: Art. 3682 of the Civil Code provides that "a holographic
testament must be an act separate from other writings and books in which the
testator customarily records his affairs. Letters, no matter how express they
are with respect to the disposition of the property, cannot constitute a holo-
graphic testament.1
If written on several sheets it is not necessary that each be dated and signed.
Cass. Apr. I4, i89o, D. i89i, I, 215; Cass. May 28, 1894, D. 1894, I, 533; 13
Laurent, Principes de droit civil frangais, no. 212; 3 Planiol, Traiti ilimentaire
de droit civil (6th ed.) no. 2693; Frankenstein, Das eigenhiindige Testament nach
dem biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch, 71.
'Belgium:. App. Brussels, Feb. 29, I866, Pas. 1868, 2, 227.
France: App. Besangon, June 6, 1882, D. 1883, 2, 6o; Trib. Civ. Beauvais,
July 1, I897, D. i898, 2, 502.
Germany: 5 Planck, 623; i Strohal, 104.
Italy: Vitali, Delle successioni, in 3 Fiore, etc., I1 diritto civile Italiano
(Naples, I9O7) 48.
United States: Philbrick v. Spangler (i86o) I5 La. Ann. 46.
'France: 3 Planiol, no. 2693; Baudry-Lacantinerie & Colin, no. ipoi.
Germany: 5 Planck, 622.
Italy: 3 Vitali, no. 43.
In Austria the Hebrew and Jewish languages are forbidden. r Stubenrauch,
Commentar zum allgemeinen biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch, 740.
It may probably be expressed in stenographic signs. Kipp, 36; 5 Planck, 623;
i Strohal, io6; 3 Vitali, no. 61. Contra: 3 Endemann, 118.
"With respect to the signature it may be observed .that according to the con-
tinental doctrines it must be at the -end of the instrument, although it may be
followed by the date. The signature cannot be in the body of the instrument.
France: App. Douai, Jan. 31, 1898, D. 1898, 2, 424; Trib. Baug6, June 14, I898,
D. 1899, 2, 325; see also Cass. Oct. 23, 1899, D. 1899, I, 568. These cases are
criticized in 3 Colin & Capitant, 85r. It has been held in France that the
signature may be on the envelope where it is clear that it was meant as such.
In the particular case there was a statement on the envelope that it was the
testator's will. App. Bourges, Jan. 15, i9o8, D. 1909, 2, 12o. A contrary con-
clusion was reached by In re Manchester (1917, Cal.) 163 Pac. 358.
Germany: 3 Endemann, i8; 5 Planck, 624; 1 Strohal, io8.
In the United States, unless specifically required by statute, as for example
by section 3366 of the Mississippi Code, the signature need not be at the end
and may be in the body of the instrument. In re Stratton (1896) 112 Cal. 513,
44 Pac. Io28; In re Camp's Estate (IoI) I34 Cal. 233, 66 Pac. io28; Lawson
v. Dawson's Estate (1899) 21 Tex. Civ. App. 361, 53 S. W. 64; Dinning v.
Dinning (I9O4) io2 Va. 467, 46 S. E. 373. Contra: Succession of Armant
(89) 43 La. Ann. 310, 9 So. 5o.
In Re McMahon (1917, Cal.) 163 Pac. 669, it was held that where the signature
is not at the end it must appear from the face of the will that it was placed
where it was for the purpose of execution.
There is doubt on the continent whether a person who does not belong to
the class of princes, bishops and the like may use his first name as a signature.
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It is denied by 5 Planck, 623, and by Herzfelder, 61o.- The initials of the
testator are not a sufficient signature, although the testator was in the habit
of so signing. Dalloz, Codes Annot~s, Code Civil, art. 97o, no. 569; 3 Colin &
Capitant, 85o. Nor is a sign sufficient. Dalloz, art. 97o, no. 57o; Kipp, 38;
5 Planck, 624; Herzfelder, 61o; i Strohal, io8.
The Civil Code of Japan, art. io68, requires the giving of the full name.
The first name has been held sufficient in this country when it was shown
that the testator habitually signed his first name alone and intended a complete
execution of the instrument. See Knox's Estate (i8go) 131 Pa. 210, 18 Atl. 1021.
Whether postscripts and marginal additions written after the completion of
the will must be signed and dated will depend somewhat upon the facts.
According to the law of Belgium and France it is clear that they must be
signed and dated if they introduce new provisions. Cass. (Belg.) Apr. 13,
1882; Pas. 1882, 1, io8; Cass. (Fr.) Aug. 16, 1881, D. 1882, 1, 247; App. Caen,
Apr. 16, 1885, D. I89o, 2, 357; Baudry-Lacantinerie & Colin, no. 1913; Planiol,
no. 2693. But not if they merely explain the will. Cass. (Fr.) Nov. 22, 187o,
D. 1872, 1, 272; Baudry-Lacantinerie & Colin, no. I914; Planiol, no. 2693. The
matter is not determined in Germany. Planck holds that all additions must be
signed and dated (V, p. 63o). According to Kipp it is necessary to do so only
if the additions are written at a different place and on a different day than the
original will (p. 39). Herzfelder is of the opinion that the date must be added
but not the signature (p. 615). According to Article 3679 of the Civil Code
of Argentina the dispositions of the testator written below his signature must
be dated and signed. Under the Civil Codes of Spain (art. 688), Honduras
(art. 885), Porto Rico (art. 696), and of the Philippines (1899, art. 688) any
correction, interlineation, or addition must be signed by the testator. Accord-
ing to the Civil Code of Japan (art. io68) any insertion, erasure, or other
alteration in a holographic deed is void unless the testator marks the place,
makes an additional statement that such alteration is made, specially signs it,
and affixes his seal to the place of alteration.
Cass. Feb. 9, 1915, D. 1916, I, 198.
Cass. Mch. 5, 1913, D. 1913, I, 432.
Civil Code, art. 578.
St. sec. 8oI2.










"Rev. Civil Code, art. 1588.
'Rev. Code, 1907, sec. 4727.
" Comp. L., 1913, sec. 5648.
"Code, sec. ioo6.
"Civil Code, art. 775.
"Civil Code, art. 688.
"Civil Code, art. 696.
"Civil Code of 1899, art. 688.
'Civil Code, art. 885.
'a Cass. (Fr.) Mch. 7, 1898, D. 1898, 1, 214; Cass. (Fr.) Mch. 2, 19o3, D.
1903, I, 152; 13 Laurent, no. 189; 2. Baudry-Lacantinerie & Colin, no. 1928.
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Heffner v. Heffner (1896) 48 La. Ann. io88, 20 So. 281; Estate of Carpenter
(igi6) 172 Cal. 268, 156 Pac. 464; In re Vance's Estate (1917, Cal.) 162 Pac. 1O3.
'Argentina: Civil Code, art. 3696.
France: Baudry-Lacantinerie & Colin, no. 1934; 3 Colin & Capitant, 848;
Planiol, no. 2690.
Germany: 5 Planck, 625.
Italy: Cass. Turin, Feb. II, I87O, Giurisprudenza italiana, I87o, 1, 156; Giuris-
prudenza italiana sul codice civile, art. 775, no. 27o et seq.; Lomonaco, 4
Istituzioni di diritto civile (2d ed.) 153; 7 Pacifici-Mazzoni, Codice civile
italiano, Successione (4th ed. 19o6) 17.
Switzerland: Escher, Das Er recht des schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuch, 90.
"Easter 1918" would not be sufficient according to Planck inasmuch as Ger-
many recognizes both Easter Sunday and Easter Monday as holidays and it is
uncertain therefore on which of these two days the instrument was written.
5 Planck, 625.
The date may be specified perhaps with reference to private events, for
example, "on the day of the birth of our son Charles." Baudry-Lacantinerie &
Colin, no. 1934; 5 Planck, 625; Herzfelder, 613. According to Escher there
is doubt (p. 90).
All would probably concede that a date may be specified with reference to
a public event, for example, "on the day of the declaration of war by Germany
on France." So 3 Colin & Capitant 848.
"Billing's Estate (1884) 64 Cal. 427, I Pac. 70; Robertson's Succession
(1897) 49 La. Ann. 868, 21 So. 586; Estate of Plumel (1907) 151 Cal. 77, 9o
Pac. 192; Re Noyes (1909) 40 Mont. 19o, io5 Pac. 17.
'Belgium: Encyclopidie du droit civil BeIge, Code Civil, art. 97o, no. 78;
2 Thiry, Cours de droit civil, 388-389.
France: Cass. July 7, 1869, D. 1870, 1, 76; "Baudry-Lacantinerie & Colin, no.
1938; 13 Laurent, no. 210-211; Planiol, no. 2690.
Germany: Reichsgericht, Oct. 13, 1902, 52 R G 277; Leonhard, Erbrecht,
5 Biermann, Kommentar zum biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch und seinen Nebenge-
setzen, 380; 5 Planck, 625.
Italy: Cass. Rome, May 4, 19O1, Foro Italiano 19O1, I, 849; Giurisprudenza
sul codice civile, art 775, no. 295 et seq.; 7 Pacifici-Mazzoni, 18.
United States: Swanson's Succession (1913) 132 Ia. 6ol, 61 So. 685.
Belgium: App. Brussels, Feb. 29, 1868, Pas. 1868, 2, 227.
Fraihce: App. Besangon, Dec. ig, 1877, D. 1879, 2, 64; Dalloz, art. 970, no.
182; Fuzier-Herman, Code civil annoti, art. 970, no. 131; Baudry-Lacantinerie
& Colin, no. 1942; 3 Colin & Capitant, 848. Contra: 13 Laurent, no. 210.
Germany: Reichsgericht, Oct. 13, 1902, 52 R G 277; Dec. 17, 1913, 48 Gruchot,
Beitrdige zur Erliiuterung des deutschen Rechts, 366; Kammergericht, Dec.
17-24, 19oo, 21 Jahrbuch der Entscheidungen des Kammergerichts, 56.
Italy: Cass. Florence, Dec. 3, 1887, Giurisprudenza italiana, XXX, 535; App.
Milan, May io, 1878, Monitore dei tribunale 1878, 520.
United States: Succession of Fuqua (1875) 27 La. Ann. 271; Zerega v.
Percival (1894) 46 La. Ann. 590, 15 So. 476.
'Baudry-Lacantinerie & Colin, no. 1938; Leonhard, 380; Frankenstein, 69-70.
Zerega v. Percival (1894) 46 La. Ann. 590, 15 So. 476.
' App. Paris, Apr. 5, 1851, D. 1852, 2, 123; Dalloz, art. 970, no. 163.
"Belgium: Cass. Apr. 2, 1857, Pas. 1857, 1, 234; App. Brussels, Mch. 1O,
1886, Pas. 1886, 2, 265.
France: 3 Colin & Capitant, 848.
'Cass. Apr. 2, 1857, D. 1857, 2, 142; Cass. Mch. 26, 1875, Pas. 1875, I, 207;
D. 1875, 2, 217; Cass. Mch. 14, 1895, Pas. 1895, I, 119; D. 1896, 2, 283; App.
Brussels, Oct. II, i89o, Pas. 1891, 2, 162.
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0 Encyclopedie du droit civil beige, Code civil, art. 97o, no. 73.
' Cass. July 20, 1886, D. 1887, I, 83; Cass. July I6, 1895, D. 1896, I, 196;
Baudry-Lacantinerie & Colin, no. 1948; Planiol, no. 269o; 6 Huc, Commentaire
thiorique et pratique du Code civil, 348; Saleilles, De la date dans le testament
ologrgphe (1904) Revue trimestrielle de droit civil, 92 et seq.
'SDecisions of Reichsgericht, of Apr. 7, 1902 (51 R G I66), of Oct. 13, 1902
(52 R G 277) and of Dec. 6, i9o6 (64 R G 423); Kammergericht, Oct. 12,
1905, 31 Entscheidungen des Kammergerichts, 1O3.
The German jurists are divided. Accord: 3 Endemann, i19; Kipp, 36;
Herzfelder, 613. Contra: Leonhard, 382-383; 5 Planck, 627-628; I Strohal,
III, 114.
Cass. Naples, June 5, 1866, Annali 1866-67, 1, 262; Cass. Palermo, Mch.
20, I870, La Legge 1870, I, 798; Cass. Turin, Jan. 21, 1876, Foro italiano 1876,
1, 319; Giurisprudenza sul Codice civile, art. 755, no. 374 et seq.; 3 Borsari,
Commentario del codice civile italiano, 317; 4 Lomonaco, Istitutzioni di diritto
civile italiano (2d ed.) 153; Losana, La succession testainentarie, 194; 7 Pacifici-
Mazzoni, 22; 3 Ricci, Corso di diritto civile, 376-377; 3 Vitali, 122.
7o Trani, Jan. 3, 1894, Giurisprudenza italiana 1894, 2, 250.
Gabba takes a view which differs from that of the other writers. He con-
tends that the purpose of the date is not to ascertain the capacity of the testator
but the seriousness of the testator's intention to execute a will. The will should
therefore be allowed to 1e ante-dated or post-dated as long as there is nothing
in the will to contradict the date given. If the testator contradicts the date in
the instrument itself the seriousness of his intention is disproved. Gabba,
Verita delle data di un, testamento olografo confrontato con Un codicillo. 2
Quistioni di diritto civile (2d ed. 1911) II5-118.
' The statement is made by several decisions of the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia that the date need not be the true date. See Estate of Fay (1904) I4
Cal. 82, 78 Pac. 340; Estate of Clisby (i9O4) 145 Cal. 407, 78 Pac. 964. The
former case upheld a will written in I889 and erroneously dated "1859." The
latter case held that where a will was not finished on the day when it was
begun the testator might adopt the earlier date indicated at the beginning of
the will.
' All countries would seem to be agreed that a holographic will need not be
completed on one day. If parts of it are written on different days each part
may be signed and dated, but this is not necessary. The final signature and
date suffice. See Argentina: Civil Code, art. 3681; Japan: 4 De Becker, 98.
74Leonhard, 381.
SSaleilles, 124. But see Cass. July 15, 1846, D. 1846, 1, 342; Dalloz, Art.
970, n. 193.
"Estate of Clisby (i9o4) 145 Cal. 407, 78 Pac. 964.
Article 368o of the Argentine Code has the provision that where a number of
dispositions are signed without being dated and the last disposition has a
signature and date, such date validates the dispositions preceding it, whatever
be the date thereof.
'France: Cass. Jan. II, 1886, D. I886, 1, 44o; Cass. June 1I, 1902, 1, 434;
App. Orleans, Mch. 8, 1883, D. 1884, 2, 227; 3 Colin & Capitant, 855.
The earlier French law allowed the date to be contradicted only by means of
an "inscription de faux." Cass. Feb. 22, 1853, D. 1853, I, 131. So still App.
Toulouse, June 5, i8g, D. I899, 2, 343.
Italy: See 3 Vitali, no. I59.
"'France: Cass. July 20, 1886, D. 1887, 1, 83; Cass. June I1, 192o, D. 19o2, I,
434; App. Orlkans, Mch. 8, 1883, D. 1884, 2, 227; 3 Colin & Capitant, 855.
Italy: See 3 Vitali, no. 159 at p. 144; 3 Ricci, no. 214.
" App. Gand, Dec. 26, 1872, Pas. 1873, 2, 86; 2 Thiry, Cours de droit civil, 387.
COMMENTS
Cass. May 8, 1855, D. 1855, 1, 163; Cass. June 28, 1869, D. 1872, r, 32; Cass.
Mch. 31, x896, D. 1897, 1, 456; Cass. Jan. 9, 19oo, D. 19oo, I, 97.
To the effect that it cannot be corrected by evidence outside the will see Cass.
Dec. 15, 1879, D. 188o, I, 267.
' Cass. Florence, Feb. 24, 187o, Annali, 187o, i, x6; Cass. Turin, Jan. 21,
1876, Foro italiano, 1876, I, 319; Cass. Turin, June 27, 1882, Giurisprudenza
italiana 1882, I, 6o9; App. Catania, Apr. 2, 1886, Foro italiano 1886, I, 614;
App. Milan, Oct. 25, 1899, Monitore dei tribunali 19oo, 44; Giurisprudenza
italiana sul codice civile, art. 755, no. 374 et seq.
Article 3677 lays down the following principle in this matter: "An incorrect
or incomplete date may be considered sufficient when the vice which it presents
is the result of mere inadvertence on the part of the testator and there are in
the testament itself material efunciations or elements which fix the date in a
certain manner. The judge may weigh the enunciations which correct the
date, and admit any evidence obtained outside of the testament."
'Estate of Fay (I9O4) 145 Cal. 82, 78 Pac. 340.
" Decisions of Reichsgericht of June 16, 1882 (7 R G 292) ; Jan. 20, 1899
(43 R G 378) ; Mch. 3, 1902 (58 Seuffert's Archiv, 25) ; Kammergericht Oct.
12, 1905, 31 Entscheidungen des Kammergerichts, IO3.
'Decision of Reichsgericht of Dec. 6, 19o6 (64 R G 423).
'Belghm: Encyclop6die du droit- civil beige, Code civil, art. 970, no. 56;
2 Thiry, 387.
'UFrance: Cass. Jan. 18, 1858, D. I858, 1, 24 (authentic will); Baudry-
Lacantinerie & Colin, no. 196o; but see Cass. May 29, 1889, D. 1889, 1, 273.
' Italy: App. Milan, Oct. 25, 1899, Monitore dei tribunali 19oo, 44.
'Argentina: art. 3677.
o The Kammergericht, decision of Nov. 22, 19o9, would seem to authorize
the completion of an incomplete date from the will itself. 20 Rechtsprechung
der Oberlandesgerichte, 428. So also Herzfelder, 613; contra: Leonhard, 379;
5 Planck, 625.
It seems to be clear, however, that several dates, each of which is defective,
may supplement each other. Kammergericht, Feb. 14, 1907, 14 Rechtsprechung
der Oberlandesgerichte, 302; Leonhard, 380; Herzfelder, 613.
' See it re Vance's Estate (I917, Cal.) 162 Pac. 1O3.
'Argentina: Civil Code, art. 3678.
Belgium: Encyclopedie du droit civil beige, Code civil, art. 970, no. 77.
France: Baudry-Lacantinerie & Colin, no. 1929; 3 Colin & Capitant, 849;
Planiol, no. 2693.
Italy: Cass. Rome, May 13, 19Ol, Giurisprudenza italiana, I9OI, I, 913; App.
Florence, July 26, I869, Annali III, 2, 392; Giurisprudenza sul codice civile
italiano, art. 775, no. 253.
United States: Stead v. Curtis (igii, C. C. A. 9th) 191 Fed. 529; Succession
of Hall (1876) 28 La. Ann. 57.
'Civil Code, art. 505.
'Civil Code, sec. 2231.
" Germany: Kammergericht, Feb. 25, I9O1, 21 Entscheidungen des Kammer-
gerichts, 222; 3 Endemann, 119; Leonhard, 379; Kipp, 36. But see Kammer-
gericht, Nov. 22, 1909, 20 Rechtsprechung der Oberlandesgerichte, 428; (igio)
Deutsche Juristenzeittng, 653.
Switzerland: Escher, go.
' "En route from X to Y" or a similar expression is sufficient. 5 Planck,
625; Herzfelder, 612.
' Frankenstein, Das eigenhiindige Testament nach dem biirgerlichen Gesetz-
buch (1913) 69-70.
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Literature:
The subject is treated in all the text-books on the civil codes of the various
countries, the principal ones of which have been cited in the foregoing comment.
The most detailed account of holographic wills is to be found in Vitali, Delle
Successioni, in 3 Fiore, etc. ed. Ii Diritto Civile Italiano, Naples, 1907.
A considerable special literature has arisen in Germany because of the fact
that the holographic will is new there, being recognized only since igoo. See
for example, Brock, Das eigenhiindige Testament. Berlin, 19oo; Frankenstein,
Das eigenhdudige Testament nach dem bfirgerlichen Gesetgbuch. Diss., 1913;
and the literature there cited.-
See also: Franchetti, Ii testamento olografo, Annali I866-I867; Gabba, Verita
della data di un testamento olografo confrontato con un codicillo, 2 Quistioni
di diritto civile (2d ed.) 113; Michaux, Trats pratique des testaments notarigs,
olographes, mystiques (2d ed.) Paris, 1873; Picard, note under Cass. Nov. 5,
1913, Dalloz, 1914, I, 233; Ridolfo, La data falsa nel testamento olografo, La
Legge, 1887, I, lO5; Saleilles, De la date dans le testament olographe, Revue
trimestrielle de droit civil, 19o3, 587; 19o4, 89.
